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The recent case of Hardenbergh v. Commissioner1 raises
the question of whether a renunciation of a share in a deced-
ent's estate is a taxable transfer under the federal estate
and gift taxes. In Brown v. Routzhan,2 a decedent renounc-
ed part of the property which had been devised to him by
his wife's will. Although this renunciation took place eight
years after the probate of the will, it was valid under state
law, since it was made before final distribution. In holding
that the decedent, by renouncing, had not made a gift in
contemplation of death, the court pointed out that the gov-
ernment was attempting to collect a tax upon the exercise
of a right to refuse a gift of property, not a tax on the trans-
fer of an interest in property. The court said :3
"The decedent never owned nor had any control
of the property as donee. All that he had was a
right to accept. Coupled with this right was an
equal right to reject. Eeither could be exercised
so long as the estate was in administration. He
did reject."
In the Hardenbergh case the two petitioners, wife and
daughter of a decedent who died intestate, formally renounc-
ed their interest in the estate, with the result that the de-
cedent's son received the entire estate. The issue before
the Tax Court was whether the petitioners had made a tax-
able gift of their share of the estate to the son. The court
said that under the intestate laws of Minnesota, the state
in which decedent died, the petitioners had no power to
prevent, by renunciation, the vesting of title of the property
in themselves. It was further held that the instrument
executed by the petitioners renouncing their shares evidenc-
ed "the passage of title from petitioners of the property they
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1950.
1 17 T.C. #20 (1951).
63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
3 Ibid., p. 917.
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had inherited under the laws of Minnesota," and that this
action constituted a transfer which was subject to the gift
tax. The court distinguished Brown v. Routzhan on the
basis that a will was involved there, while in Hardenbergh
the decedent died intestate and under state law a devisee or
legatee could renounce, but there was no such provision for
a person taking by intestacy.
In Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, the Tax Court made no
attempt to distinguish the case from Brown v. Routzhan on
the ground that "transfer" should be defined differently
under the gift and estate taxes. Nor does it appear that
there is any distinction between the two cases on this basis.
The term "transfer" is used in both taxes without any
attempt to define it.4 However the cases indicate that it is
used in the same sense in connection with both the estate
and gift tax. Thus in Burnet v. Guggenheimrs the Supreme
Court said that Congress, in enacting the gift tax statute,
had adopted the concept of "transfer" as interpreted under
the estate tax.6 In other cases the courts have repeated that
the two taxes are closely related and the "transfer" under
the gift tax means the same thing as transfer under the
estate tax.7
Since the term transfer is used in the same sense under
both taxes it would appear that the Hardenbergh case is
either inconsistent with Brown v. Routzahn, or that it must
stand on the basis of a distinction between the renunciation
of property passing under a will and by intestacy.
26 U.S.O.A. § 811 Gross Estate. This section includes in the gross
estate of decedent the value at his death of all property (c) (1) "to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or other wise--
(A) in contemplation of his death:"
26 U.S.AC.A. § 1000 (a) imposes a tax on the transfer of property by
gift and states in (b) "The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in
trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible:"
288 U.S. 280 (1933).
0 Ibid. The court stated that the gift and estate taxes were in pari
materia.
7 Harris v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 861 (2nd Cir. 1949); Higgins v.
Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942).
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The distinction drawn by the Hardenbergh case finds sup-
port in the state laws of testacy and intestacy. It is usually
held that title to property does not pass to a legatee or de-
visee under a will until he accepts it, or if it does that the
title vests subject to the right to renounce and if this right
is exercised, the renunciation relates back to the testator's
death and renders the gift void from the beginning.s On
the other hand, there appears to be substantial support
among the text writers, at least, for the proposition that
when a person dies intestate his property passes to his heirs
who cannot prevent the passage of title to them by renuncia-
tion.9
Even though the distinction made in the Hardenbergh
case finds support in the local law of decedent estates, it may
well be doubted whether this should be controlling on fed-
eral tax questions. The courts have repeatedly emphasized
that taxation is not so much concerned with the technical-
ities of title as it is with changes in economic benefits and
the realities of the particular transaction.10 It appears that,
in determining whether a taxable gift has been made, the
federal courts might well ignore technicalities of title under
local law and consider whether there was such a change
in economic benefits and control over the property as to
justify the imposition of a gift or estate tax upon renun-
ciation of these rights. Although a devisee or legatee can
refuse to take the title to property, he nevertheless has had,
prior to such refusal, as much control over the property
and has enjoyed as much benefit from it as an heir who had
title forced on him and then released his right to the prop-
erty. Under this line of reasoning it is hard to perceive
4 PAGE, WILLS §§1401 and 1402 (3rd Ed 1941); In re Kalt's Estate,
16 Cal.2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940); Albany Hospital v. Hanson, 214 N.Y.
435, 108 N.E. 812 (1915); Bouse v. Hull, 168 Md. 1, 176 Atl. 645 (1935);
Coomes v. Flnegan, 233 Ia. 448, 7 N.W. 2d 729 (1943); Perkins v. Isley,
224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945); Greely v. Houston, 148 Miss. 799, 114
So. 740 (1927); Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn. 312, 137 S.W. 96 (1911).
PAGE, Ibid, § 1401. Also see DART'S LA. Civ. CODE 1945, Art. 977,
which illustrates that one state, at least, permits an heir to renounce his
intestate's share in a decedent's estate.
10 Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1932); Commissioner v. Wilder's Estate, 118
F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1941).
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any sensible distinction between Brown v. Routzahn and the
Hardenbergh case.
In Lyeth v. Hoey" the issue was whether the property
which an heir received under compromise of a will contest,
by which the will was admitted to probate and the legatee
paid the heir part of the estate, was exempt from the in-
come tax as property acquired by "gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance." Under the state law the property apparently
was received by the heir as the result of a contract. The
Supreme Court, however, held that "inheritance" as that
term was used in the federal tax statute was to be construed
according to a uniform federal definition rather than accord-
ing to the local state law and that the heir took tax-free by
inheritance. The court said:
"In dealing with the meaning and application of an
act of Congress efiacted in the exercise of its plen-
ary power under the Constitution to tax income
and to grant exemptions from that tax, it is the will
of Congress which controls, and the expression of
its will in the absence of language evidencing a
different purpose, should be interpreted 'so as to
give a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme
of taxation.' Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110,
53 S.Ct. 74, 77.*** Congress establishes its own
criteria and the state law may control only when
the federal taxing act by express language or nec-
essary implication makes its operation dependent
upon the state law.
Whether what an heir receives from the estate
of his ancestor through the compromise of his con-
test of his ancestor's will should be regarded as
within the exemption from the federal tax should
" 305 U.S. 188 (1938). See also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280
(1946) where a husband had given his wife property which she trans-
ferred to a partnership and became a partner with her husband. The
wife contributed no services to the partnership but received part of
its profits. The Court held that these profits should be taxed as income
of the husband and the Supreme Court upheld the Tax Court. The tax-
payer- contended that the partnership was valid under state law and
it should consequently be held valid for tax purposes. In overruling
this contention the court stated that a state cannot have the final word
and decide issues of federal tax law. The court continued, "But the
Tax Court in making a final authoritative finding on the question
whether this was a real partnership Is not governed by how Michigan
law might treat the same circumstances for purposes of state law."
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not be decided one way in the case of an heir in
Pennsylvania or Minnesota and in another way
in the case of an heir in Massachusetts or New
York, according to the differing views of the state
courts."
If the term inheritance is to be given a uniform meaning
under the income tax it is difficult to see why "transfer"
should not be given a uniform federal definition under the
estate and gift taxes.
According to Lyeth v. Hoey in the construction of fed-
eral tax acts terms should be interpreted "so as to give a
uniform application to a nation wide scheme of taxation"
unless there is language evidencing a different purpose.
It has also been held that a uniform federal definition should
be resorted to in gift and estate tax cases.12  The statutes
have no express language requiring that state law be fol-
lowed in deciding what constitutes a transfer,13 and the
fact that "transfer" is defined in a broad sense indicates
that local law should not confine the statutory definition.
Obviously the line of reasoning adopted by the Hardenbergh
case which makes the taxability of a renunciation turn upon
narrow distinctions of the local law of the decedent estates
may lead to a lack of uniformity in the administration of
the gift and estate taxes and result in tax distinctions which
are not based on real economic differences.14
2 Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1941) (a gift tax
case holding that federal law was to be applied in determining whether
there was consideration in a transaction); Bahr v. Commissioner, 119
F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1941) (which involved deduction provisions of the
estate tax); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941) (deciding
whether there was a gift of a future interest).
'- Supra, note 6.
' It is true that local law almost necessarily determines whether any
rights or interests in property are transferred or created. Rhodes v.
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 62 (1940). But see Richardson v. Commission-
er, 126 F.2d 562 (2nd Cir. 1942). And in some cases it has been held
not only that the rights created by a particular transaction are to be
determined by state law but also that the federal tax consequences of
such transactions are to be governed by the local law. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930); Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1937). How-
ever, most of the decisions which have held that the tax consequences
of a transaction were controlled by state law have been cases involving
community property where the results of following the local law are
hardly to be commended.
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If local law is to be disregarded and a renunciation of an
interest in an intestate estate placed upon the same footing
as a renunciation under a will there still remains the prob-
lem of whether both transactions are to be treated as a
"transfer" resulting in estate and gift tax liability or as a
mere refusal to accept a benefit which does not result in a
tax. The courts should determine which of these theories
should prevail by considering the policies of the tax laws
and the actual power, control and benefit that the heir or
devisee possesses because of his ability to refuse the prop-
erty and in that manner direct who shall receive it." In de-
ciding this issue the courts will have to take into account the
fact that by renunciation the heir or devisee could only make
the property available to a limited number of persons. An-
other factor is that the heir or devisee had this choice forced
upon him. On the other hand, however, the heir or devisee
actually has the power to dispose of the property as he
wishes and renunciation is only one means of disposal. If
a person were allowed to refuse property to which he was
entitled by the death of another and by this refusal enable
someone else to receive the property renunciation could be-
come a widely used means of tax evasion. Whether or not,
however, renunciations of interests in decedents' estates
should or should not be taxed under the estate and gift
taxes, it seems reasonably clear that there is no justification
for drawing the distinction between renunciations under a
will and renunciations in connection with intestacy. Both
should be treated as a taxable transfer, or neither should.
I In this connection It is perhaps worth noting Commissioner v. Mott,
85 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1936). In that case the court held that a trustee
who renounced all right to his commissions had not constructively
received them and that, consequently, they did not represent taxable
income to him. The Senate Finance Committee in Its report on the
1948 Revenue Bill said in part, ". . . if any person disclaims or refuses
an attempted gift a transfer by gift Is not considered made." 1948-1
Cum.BuLL. 353.
§§811 (f) (2) and 1000 (c) (2) I.R.C. as amended by PuB. L. 58, 82
CONG., 1ST SESS. (June 28, 1951) provide that the disclaimer or renuncia.
tion of a power of appointment shall not be treated a taxable transfer
under the federal estate and gift taxes.
